What is the is-ought problem?
The is-ought problem is a philosophical dilemma questioning whether moral conclusions about what ought to be can be logically derived from descriptive statements about what is. First articulated by Scottish philosopher David Hume in 1739, it suggests that transitioning from facts to values is fundamentally unclear. This concept forms the basis of the fact-value distinction and is closely tied to philosophical debates about ethics and natural properties.
What we know
- The is-ought problem questions whether prescriptive statements can be inferred from objective descriptive statements. [1, 2]
- The problem was first articulated by 18th-century Scottish philosopher David Hume in his 1738 to 1740 work A Treatise of Human Nature. [2, 3]
- The thesis is also known as Hume's law, Hume's guillotine, or the fact-value gap. [1, 2]
- The fact-value distinction is derived from and closely related to the is-ought problem, though academic discourse on the former can also include aesthetics. [2, 4]
Still open
- Whether terms like the is-ought problem and the fact-value distinction should be used interchangeably remains subject to nuance, as the former typically focuses on ethics while the latter can encompass aesthetics.
Where to go next
- whoWho was David Hume?
- the bigger pictureWhat is the fact-value distinction?
- compared withWhat is Moore's open-question argument?
- how it workedHow does epistemology study normative statements?
- whenWhen did Hume publish his Treatise of Human Nature?
- an unexpected connectionHow does the word ought connect to the number zero?The word ought shares a linguistic link as a name for the number zero, alongside its role as a modal verb and philosophical term.
Sources
- [1]is–ought problem (Wikidata Q1328762) · CC0 1.0
- [2]Is–ought problem · CC BY-SA 4.0
- [3]Naturalistic fallacy · CC BY-SA 4.0
- [4]Fact–value distinction · CC BY-SA 4.0
- [5]Ought · CC BY-SA 4.0