What is enactivism in cognitive science?
Enactivism is a cognitive science theory proposing that an organism's mind and its world are co-determined through active sensorimotor interaction and experience. Instead of passively receiving information and translating it into internal representations, living beings enact their own domains of meaning. Introduced by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch in 1991, the theory draws historical roots from Buddhism, phenomenology, and cognitive science.
What we know
- Enactivism argues that cognition arises through the interaction between an acting organism and its environment. [1, 2]
- The term enaction was introduced by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch in their 1991 book The Embodied Mind. [2]
- Enactivism has historical roots in Buddhism, phenomenology, and the cognitive sciences. [2]
- Enactivism is presented as an alternative to cognitivism, computationalism, and Cartesian dualism. [2]
Still open
- How the actions involved in enactivism relate to age-old questions about free will remains a topic of active debate.
- Some writers maintain that there remains a need for some degree of the mediating function of representation in this new approach.
Where to go next
- whoWho wrote The Embodied Mind?
- the bigger pictureHow does cognitive science study the mind?
- whenWhat was the cognitive revolution?
- how it workedHow do sensorimotor interactions build knowledge?
- compared withHow does enactivism differ from computationalism?
- an unexpected connectionHow does Buddhist philosophy connect to cognitive science?Enactivism draws its historical roots partly from Buddhist philosophy, blending ancient contemplative traditions with modern cognitive science.
Sources
- [1]enactivism (Wikidata Q431627) · CC0 1.0
- [2]Enactivism · CC BY-SA 4.0
- [3]Cognitive science · CC BY-SA 4.0
- [4]Evan Thompson · CC BY-SA 4.0
- [5]Cognitive revolution · CC BY-SA 4.0